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The Race to the Courthouse: Conflicting 
Views Toward the Judicial Review of 
OSHA standards* 
From the time that Moses directed the Israelites to con- 
struct a parapet for their roofs "that thou bring not blood upon 
thine house, if any man f d  from thence,"' to the present, the 
matter of workplace health and safety has occupied a place on 
the agenda of civilized societies. However, in the United States 
efforts to confront the problem of occupational injuries were 
sporadic and largely ineffective until the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act2 was e n a ~ t e d . ~  OSHA4 is universally consid- 
ered a landmark in the history of labor and employee health 
legislation. I t  was adopted "to assure so far as possible every 
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working ~onditions."~ 
In order to fulfill this purpose, the Act authorizes the Sec- 
retary of Labor to promulgate rules and standards6 with which 
each employer must comply.' Despite this massive attempt to 
promote the health and safety of employees, OSHA has been 
subjected to intense criticism by both protected employees and 
regulated employers. Employees argue that the regulations do 
* The author wishes to acknowledge Professor Stephen G. Wood for his 
encouragement, suggestions, and mentoring. Additional assistance was provided by 
Dr. David J. Cherrington, Steve Hill, and various members of the Brigham Young 
University Law Review staff. Finally, special thanks go to Kristy Cherrington. 
1. Deuteronomy 22:s; cf, Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm'n, 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that OSHA perime- 
ter guarding standard is only applicable to floors and not to roofs). 
2. 29 U.S.C. $8 651-678 (1988) (OSHA). 
3. The Occupational Safety and Health Act was signed into law on Decem- 
ber 29, 1970, and became effective on April 28, 1971. 
4. The term "OSHA" has been used to describe the Act, the Agency (Occupa- 
tional Safety and Health Administration), and the entire occupational safety and 
health program. For purposes of this Comment, the term "OSHA" may refer to any 
of these meanings with the presumption that the context in which it is used will 
c l e  the intended meaning. 
5. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988). 
6. Id. $ 655. 
7 .  Id. § 654. Since 1970, OSHA has established numerous rules and stan- 
dards which appear in several volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). 
The regulations primarily are located within Title 29 of the C.F.R. 
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not go far enough to adequately protect workers,' while em- 
ployers maintain OSHA's regulations are so pervasive as to 
unduly burden them with excessive and unnecessary regula- 
tion.' 
Within the enabling legislation of the Act, Congress set 
forth both extensive procedural requirements and substantive 
criteria which new standards must meet before OSHA may 
promulgate a new rule under section 6(b) of the Act.'' These 
procedural rules allow for the expression of views by interested 
persons and are designed to bring about more reasoned 
decisionmaking. However, despite such safeguards, judicial 
review by the courts of appeals is afforded to provide a system 
of checks and limitations upon the regulating agency." 
The regulatory questions of when, how, and to what extent 
OSHA may .promulgate standards have been a t  issue since 
1973.12 Consequently, the Supreme Court and various courts 
of appeals have been called upon to issue a long line of opinions 
either upholding or vacating the validity of OSHA stan- 
dards.13 The Supreme Court has substantively established 
binding principles on OSHA's rulemaking activity. These guide- 
lines limit the agency's intrusive regulatory authority while 
allowing it to Nfill its congressional mandate. These 
guidelines also stipulate the burden OSHA must bear in order 
for a challenged regulation to be judicially validated. For in- 
stance, the Court's decision in Industrial Union Department v. 
American Petroleum Institute, Inc. l4 (Benzene) imposed the re- 
8. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (the AFL-CIO chal- 
lenged both the procedures and findings OSHA used in determining new stan- 
dards); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (a public 
interest group objected to the delay in the effective date of asbestos standards). 
9. See Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 471 
(1993). 
10. 29 U.S.C. 5 655(b) (1988). 
11. According to 29 U.S.C. § 655(f), standards issued by OSHA may be chal- 
lenged by "any person who may be adversely affected by a standard." 
12. The first decision regarding a major OSHA standard was Associated 
Industries, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973) (vacating 
lavatory standard). 
13. See Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.) 
(afhming vinyl chloride standard), cert. denied, 421 US. 992 (1975); Synthetic 
Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974) (affirming 
standard for ethyleneimine) (SOCUA I), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). Contra 
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973) (vacat- 
ing lavatory standard); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 
(3d Cir. 1973) (vacating carcinogen emergency temporary standard). 
14. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene case). 
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quirement that OSHA may regulate only where it finds a "sig- 
nificant health risk."15 And in American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, Inc. u. D~novan'~ (Cotton Dust) the Court defined 
the limits of the term "feasibility," prohibiting OSHA's use of 
cost-benefit analysis in issuing standards. 
Despite these guiding principles from the Supreme Court, 
the various courts of appeals have reached divergent and con- 
flicting results in cases where OSHA standards have been 
challenged. The uneven pattern suggests that the views of the 
courts of appeals regarding their review responsibility and the 
application of the Supreme Court's guiding principles are the 
cause for the significant divergence of results. 
The marked difference in the attitude among some of the 
courts of appeals has led some parties challenging standards t o  
undertake major efforts to locate the judicial fora most apt t o  
be sympathetic to their position." Additionally, conflicting 
signals have been sent to OSHA regarding the scope of its 
rulemaking authority. As a result of this judicially created 
confusion, OSHA, industry leaders, and union representatives 
are grasping in the dark for a more definitive view of the judi- 
cial review process concerning OSHA  regulation^.'^ 
OSHA standards are more likely to  survive judicial scruti- 
ny if the courts of appeals adopt standards which are deferen- 
tial to the rulemaking authority of OSHA. By abdicating its 
responsibility to seriously scrutinize the propriety of rule pro- 
mulgation to the presumed prudence of OSHA, a court will 
rarely, if ever, find a regulation which facially falls outside the 
wide scope of OSHA's regulatory authority. Conversely, if a 
court compels OSHA to clear all of the hurdles established both 
within OSHA, and by the Supreme Court, then only the regu- 
lations which are explicitly within the scope of the section 
6(b)19 rulemaking authority will survive.20 An example of 
15. Id. at 614-15. 
16. 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (the Cotton Dust case). 
17. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 @.C. Cir. 1977) 
(transferring proceedings to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). The race to the 
courthouse becomes even more complex when one or more challenges to the 
agency's rule are Ned in multiple jurisdictions. See also American Petroleum Inst. 
v. OSHA, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2025 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 1980). 
18. See Rowena M. Duren, Note, The Employer's Dilemma: The Implications 
of Occupational Safety and Health in the Arbitral Process-Conflicting Contractual 
and Statutory Commands, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067 (1983). 
19. 29 U.S.C. 8 655(b) (1988). 
20. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regula- 
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each of these positions has been rendered by the courts within 
the past eighteen months. 
In 1991, the American Dental Association, joined by Home 
Health Services and Staffing Association, challenged a rule 
promulgated by OSHA2' during that year concerning occupa- 
tional exposure to bloodborne pathogens.22 Despite challenges 
to the rule during the adoption process:3 the standards were 
enacted. Consequently, suit was brought in the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
Speaking for the majority, Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner 
admitted that, "[the rule] may be unnecessary; it may go too 
far; its costs may exceed its  benefit^."'^ Despite this, the Sev- 
enth Circuit upheld the bloodborne-pathogen rule by adopting 
an extremely deferential posture regarding OSHA's ability to  
freely promulgate reg~lations,2~ stating: "So in the main the 
rule must be upheld. Which is not to say that it is a good 
rule . . . . But our duty as a reviewing court of generalist judges 
is merely to patrol the boundary of reasonableness, . . . OSHA's 
bloodborne-pathogens rule . . . does not cross it."26 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals exhibited a much 
different perspective of judicial review in the case of A n - C I O  
v. OSHA.27 In 1989, OSHA issued a set of permissible expo- 
sure limits (PELS) for 428 toxic substan~es .~~ Affected indus- 
tries and labor unions challenged the rule, arguing that OSHA 
tory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989). 
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1991). Bloodborne pathogens are certain disease- 
causing microorganisms found in the blood and other body fluids of some individu- 
als which can infect others whose blood or body fluids they enter. The two such 
microorganisms of greatest concern are the hepatitis B virus (HBV) and the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The regulations OSHA promulgated are designed to 
guard against the transmittal of bloodborne pathogens from patients to health care 
workers. 
22. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 172 (1993). 
23. Martin, 984 F.2d at 824. 
24. Id. at 831. See id. at 825-26 for a discussion by Judge Posner concerning 
the cost of the regulations compared to the benefit in economic terms. "No doubt 
the agency's $813 million estimate is an underestimate." Id. at 826. 
25. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HAFW. L. 
REV. 505, 510-12 (1985), for a discussion concerning the deference which courts 
apply in the absence of substantive review and the infrequency with which such 
courts invalidate agency decisions. 
26. Martin, 984 F.2d at 831. 
27. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992). 
28. 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.1000 (1989). 
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had not made sufficiently conclusive findings to justify promul- 
gation of the rule. 
The court vacated the standards and remanded to the 
agency, stating that the rule "is so flawed that it cannot 
stand."29 The court reasoned that OSHA "failed to  establish 
that existing exposure levels in the workplace present a signifi- 
cant risk of material health impairment or that the new stan- 
dards eliminate or substantially lessen the risk.'"O Also, 
"OSHA ha[d] not met its burden of establishing that [the stan- 
dards] [were] either economically or technologically fea~ible."~' 
The Eleventh Circuit came t o  this conclusion because it adopt- 
ed a "harder look" standard of review rather than the "arbi- 
trary and capricious" standard used by other circuits.32 
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the proper role 
of judicial review regarding the validity of OSHA regulations. 
The cases American Dental Assh v. Martin33 and AI?L-CIO v. 
OSHA34 will be used as vehicles to explore the conflicting rul- 
ings being handed down by the various courts of appeals. Ulti- 
mately, this Comment will draw conclusions concerning which 
formula for review reaps the most jurispmdentidy correct 
conclusions. 
To lay the necessary groundwork for such a discussion, 
Part I1 of this Comment surveys the relevant guiding principles 
established by the Supreme Court to  review OSHA regulations. 
Part I11 then examines the facts and outlines the courts' rea- 
soning in Martin and AF'L-CIO. Next, Part IV analyzes the 
holdings in Martin and AF'L-CIO from the perspective of the 
relevant requirements discussed in Part II-namely, the stan- 
dard of review, existence of a significant risk of material health 
impairment, and whether the regulations are feasible. Finally, 
Part V concludes that the holding in AFL-CIO is preferable to 
that of Martin. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Cir- 
cuit, in deciding AFL-CIO, properly adhered to the binding 
principles established by the Supreme Court in order to  reach 
an economically and socially efficient outcome. 
29. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 986. 
30. Id. at 980. 
31. Id. at 982. 
32. Id  at 970. 
33. 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993). 
34. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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11. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR VALIDATION 
OF OSHA STANDARDS 
OSHA's authority to  issue legally enforceable occupational 
safety and health standards is extremely broad. Congress, 
when establishing OSHA, made certain of this in the "Findings 
and Purpose" section of the Act.35 This section supplies policy 
guidance concerning the purposes of the OSHA standards, 
which emphasize the overriding protective goal of the stan- 
dards. A cursory review of the OSHA rulemaking authority 
may give the impression that, but for some limited procedural 
requirements, OSHA retains limitless flexibility and discretion 
to decide the stringency, and thus the cost, of its standards.36 
However, Congress did not intend, nor has the judiciary been 
willing to allow, OSHA to act unchecked. 
Despite numerous challenges, OSHA has been largely, but 
not uniformly, successful in upholding its standards when chal- 
lenged in federal courts. For instance, while OSHA suffered a 
setback in the Benzene case, the Supreme Court upheld its 
regulation in the Cotton Dust case. Through these and other 
cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted congressional intent 
concerning the appropriate role of the courts when reviewing 
challenged OSHA regulations. 
A. The Standard of Review 
In judicial proceedings reviewing OSHA standards, a criti- 
cal issue is the scope of the court's authority to review OSHA's 
determinations. This is commonly referred to  as the standard 
35. In part, this section provides: 
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out 
of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance 
to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical 
expenses, and disability compensation payments. 
(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the 
exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and 
with foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so 
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and 
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources . . . . 
29 U.S.C. 8 651 (1988). 
36. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (arguing that Congress has given administrative 
agencies unwarranted leeway under regulatory statutes and that Congress must 
pass regulatory statutes themselves with more particularity). 
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of re vie^.^' The apparent conflict between the various circuits 
concerning the appropriate standard of review stems from dif- 
fering amounts of deference afforded to OSHA by the courts. 
Prior to  the enactment of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, courts applied a more searching "substantial evi- 
dence" test when decisions were made by regulatory agencies 
after administrative adjudications or following completion of a 
formal rulemaking pro~ess.~' At the same time, a less strin- 
gent "arbitrary and capricious" test was employed when review- 
ing agency rules issued after only an informal rulemaking 
pro~eeding.~~ 
Concerning the standard of review to be employed when 
reviewing challenges to  OSHA regulations, Congress directed 
that "[tlhe determinations of the Secretary [of Labor] shall be 
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a Despite such seemingly plain lan- 
guage, the various courts of appeals have adopted vastly differ- 
ing amounts of deference to OSHA standards when employing 
the "substantial evidence" standard. 
OSHA rulemaking creates a unique situation when deter- 
mining the appropriate standard of review. OSHA regulations 
are promulgated through an essentially informal process simi- 
lar to  the procedures outlined in section 4 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act? Given the similarity between OSHA and APA 
rulemaking proceedings, the appropriate standard of review 
becomes difficult to distinguish. Section 10(e) of the APA42 
calls for agency action to be reviewed using the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.43 The APA directs the judiciary to  apply 
37. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1992). 
38. Administrative Procedure Ad (APA), 5 U.S.C. 8 556(d) (1988). "'Formal' 
rulemaking . . . requires the agency to promulgate a rule on the basis of a record 
created through trial-type procedures . . . ." STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND 
ITS REFORM 347 (1982). The procedural requirements to be followed during the 
formal rulemaking process are listed in sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. 88 556-557 (1988). 
39. 5 U.S.C. $8 553, 706 (1988). "[I]nformal rulemaking . . . requires the 
agency only to give notice of a proposed rule and allow comment upon it before 
the agency makes up its mind." BREYER, supra note 38, a t  347. See Stephen G. 
Wood et al., Regulation, Deregulation, and Re-regulation: An American Perspective, 
1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 381, 412, for a discussion of the process of promulgating rules 
under the informal rulemaking process. 
40. 29 U.S.C. $ 655(f) (1988) (emphasis added). 
41. 5 U.S.C. 3 553 (1988). Informal rulemaking is also referred to as notice 
and comment rulemaking. BREYER, supra note 38, at  116. 
42. 5 U.S.C. 8 706 (1988); Wood et al., supra note 39, at 414. 
43. Agency action may be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
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the "arbitrary and capricious" standard based upon the nature 
of the rulemaking proceeding, while OSHA's enabling legisla- 
tion clearly mandates "substantial evidence." 
This dichotomy caused both the courts and Congress to 
question whether the procedural guidelines of the APA were 
adequate to  provide sufficient safeguards.44 Consequently, an- 
other type of rulemaking category was created-hybrid 
rulemaking. "Hybrid rulemaking does not describe a single type 
of rulemaking proceeding, but includes any rulemaking pro- 
ceeding that involves more procedure than informal rulemaking 
but less procedure than formal r~lemaking."~~ A crucial issue 
confronting the courts reviewing the challenged OSHA regula- 
tions was whether the proper standard t o  be applied was the 
one generally applied to informal rulemaking-the arbitrary 
and capricious t e ~ t ~ ~ - o r  whether the less deferential stan- 
dard should be applied. 
Until recently, review of agency standards was extremely 
limited. In early cases, courts afforded agencies great deference 
and "upheld their policy choices as long as they were not whol- 
ly irrat i~nal ."~~ During this period, "Ijludges reserved substan- 
tive review for instances of adjudication and formal 
rulemaking, to which they applied the 'substantial evidence' 
standard-a standard purportedly distinct from, and stricter 
than, the arbitrary and capricious test applied to informal 
rulemaki~~g."~~ 
By the mid-1970s the hard-look doctrine had become sig- 
nificantO4' Applying this doctrine, courts "appeared to be de- 
manding something more rigorous than mere consideration and 
e~planation."~~ They required agencies to promulgate rules 
based upon valid policy judgements that could be substantiated 
by evidence. This hard-look test served two major purposes. 
First was the "requirement that agencies' fmdings of fact have 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. $ 706(2) (1988). 
44. See Wood et al., supra note 39, at 412. 
45. Id. at 413 (citations omitted). 
46. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (1988) (APA dictating the use of the arbitrary and 
capricious test for rules resulting from informal proceedings); see Motor Vehicle 
Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 US.  29, 41 (1983). 
47. Garland, supra note 25, at  532; see Bowman Tramp., Inc. v. Arkansas- 
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 290 (1974) (arbitrary and capricious standard 
requires nothing more than a rational basis for the treatment of evidence). 
48. Garland, supra note 25, at 532 & 11.147. 
49. See id. at 510-11. 
50. Id. at 533. 
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a basis in the re~ord."~' This si&ied a new approach to regu- 
lation-a presumption against regulation unless the agency 
could make a sufficient showing. Second, the hard-look doctrine 
"reestablished agency fidelity to congressional intent."52 By 
holding agencies accountable for their findings, the courts were 
able to see that agencies did not exceed their congressionally 
granted powers. 
The proper application of this standard within the context 
of OSHA regulations was a major issue confronting the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit when called 
upon to review standards regulating asbestos hazards in Indus- 
trial Union Department v. H o d g s ~ n . ~ ~  Here, the court enunci- 
ated a relatively deferential approach to OSHA's standards de- 
signed t o  more effectively protect employees. In order to reach 
this conclusion, the Hodgson court noted that the legislative 
history, notwithstanding the statutory language, supported the 
type of review "customarily . . . directed to adjudicatory pro- 
ceedings or formal rulemaking."54 The court also recognized 
that many of the issues confronting OSHA would be on the 
"frontiers of scientific knowledge."55 Additionally, the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals decided to resolve doubts in favor 
of employee health, since "the protection of the health of em- 
ployees is the overriding concern of OSHA."56 Thus, while the 
court insisted that its review must be calculated t o  prevent 
arbitrary and unreasonable standards, a deferential approach 
to  OSHA standards was adopted. 
This deferential approach has been adopted by several of 
the circuits. These courts have defined "substantial evidence" 
as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a c~nclusion."~' Under this deferential 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 512. 
53. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
54. Id. at 473 (citations omitted). 
55. Id. at 474. In American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, the Fifth Circuit resolved 
this question by stating that the science-policy regulations which OSHA promul- 
gates require deference from the "nonspecialist, biomedically unsophisticated Article 
111 judiciary." Martin, 984 F.2d at 828. For a further discussion of the science-poli- 
cy questions, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in 
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in 
EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 731-47 (1979). 
56. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at  475. 
57. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. 
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)). 
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standard, a reviewing court may not displace an agency's con- 
clusion even if the evidence supports conflicting inferences "so 
long as a reasonable person could reach that conclu~ion."~~ 
Additionally, "[wlhere the agency's policy determinations are 
based upon complex scientific and factual data, or involve spec- 
ulative projections, [the court's] review is particularly deferen- 
t i a P 9  
Proponents of this deferential approach point to statements 
from the Supreme Court to support their claim. For example, 
the Court has stated that because "[OSHA] places responsibili- 
ty for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts 
of appeals, . . . '[the] Court will intervene only in what ought to 
be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence] standard 
appears to  have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied' by 
the court below.'s0 As a result, advocates of OSHA regulations 
commonly contend that challengers have failed to show that a 
court of appeals misapprehended or grossly misapplied the 
standard of review? 
This deferential approach is not unanimously applied by 
all circuits. First, the burden of proof remains upon OSHA to 
justify its standards.62 Critics of the deferential approach note 
that shifting the burden of proof to the challengers will have 
the effect of diluting the standard of review to the point that 
the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality become pres- 
entB3 In such an atmosphere, OSHA would be free to impose 
whatever rule it preferred, regardless of the cost, need, or prob- 
ability of desired result. 
Second, there is a fundamental division concerning the 
rigors of the "substantial evidence" standard." Under the 
"substantial evidence" test, "[courts] must take a 'harder look' 
58. National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 866 F.2d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(citing Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 976 F.2d 1479, 1485 @.C. 
Cir. 1986)). 
59. Id. at  729 (citing Forging Indus. Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 
1436, 1443 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
60. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 523 (quoting Universal Camera, 340 US. a t  
491). 
61. See Brief for the Federal Parties at  20, Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) 
(Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583). 
62. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at  653. 
63. See Tracy N. Tool, Note, Begging to Defer: OSHA and the Problem of In- 
terpretive Authority, 73 m. L. REV. 1336 (1989). 
64. The "substantial evidence" standard is mandated by Congress within 
OSHA's enabling legislation. See 29 U.S.C. 5 655(f) (1988). 
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at OSHA's action than [they] would if [they] were reviewing the 
action under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard applicable to agencies governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.'@' The substantial evidence test requires 
OSHA "to identify relevant factual evidence, to explain the 
logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state 
candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its 
reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and argu- 
ment.'@6 However, the agency cannot rely on the notice and 
comment nature of the informal rulemaking procedure to stack 
the deck in its favor by presenting only favorable conclusions. 
The Eleventh Circuit noted, "Considering the record 'as a 
whole' further requires that reviewing courts 'take into account 
not just evidence that supports the agency's decision, but also 
countervailing evidence.' "" 
This rendition of the "substantial evidencelhard-look" test 
provides for more rigorous scrutiny than the deferential ap- 
proach taken by some circuits. Nevertheless, Congress delegat- 
ed unusually broad discretionary authority to establish stan- 
dards necessary to protect  employee^.^' Proponents of the 
hard-look approach argue that the proper standard of review is 
for reviewing courts to "provide a careful check on the agency's 
determinations without substituting its judgement for that of 
the agency. . . [and] to  ensure that the regulations resulted 
from a process of reasoned decisionmaking consistent with the 
agency's mandate fkom Congress.'@g In the alternative, under 
the traditional arbitrary and capricious standard, OSHA is able 
to promulgate standards although the new rules are based 
65. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
66. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); see also Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
B r e ~ a n ,  503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). 
67. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 970 (quoting AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 
649 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
68. See 29 U.S.C. # 651(b) (1988). 
69. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
By requiring not only that the agency set forth a rationale consistent 
with the statutory purpose and outline available alternatives, but also 
that the agency support its hdings  of fact with record evidence and 
choose a final outcome that is reasonable in light of the facts, alterna- 
tives, and statutory purpose, a court can substantially decrease the odds 
that an agency decision motivated by improper purposes will escape inval- 
idation. 
Garland, supra note 25, at 557. 
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upon improper motives and do not exhibit fidelity to the Agen- 
cy's Congressional mandate." Although OSHA was empow- 
ered with broad rulemaking authority, neither Congress nor 
the Supreme Court recognizes the Agency's ability to make un- 
checked findings. Congress placed the responsibility to guard 
against discretionary excesses by OSHA squarely upon the 
courts of appeals." 
B. Existence of a Significant Risk of 
Material Health Impairment 
OSHA defines the occupational health and'safety standard 
as "a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or 
use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or 
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe 
or healthful employment and places of empl~yment."'~ To jus- 
tify issuing a standard, "OSHA [must] make a threshold find- 
ing that a significant risk of material health impairment ex- 
i s t ~ " ? ~  to employees and that the new standard is "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" to eliminate or substantially reduce 
that risk.74 Therefore, OSHA is not entitled to arbitrarily reg- 
ulate any risk; rather, only those which present a "significant 
risk of material health impairment."75 
In the Benzene case, a sharply divided Supreme Court 
vacated OSHA benzene standardd6 In this plurality decision, 
the Court set forth some guiding principles to be used when 
determining what health impairments are material and what 
constitutes a significant risk. The Court held that assuming the 
existence of risk, based merely upon an OSHA finding, 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from OSHA to the 
70. 'When a court declines to scrutinize (or even assumes the existence of) 
supporting facts, ignores the presence of alternatives, and requires nothing more 
than a minimally rational explanation, almost any outcome can pass muster-even 
if it springs from an unstated, inappropriate motive." Garland, supra note 25, at 
556. 
71. 29 U.S.C. 8 655(f) (1988). 
72. Id 8 652(8) (emphasis added). 
73. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 972 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Benzene, 
448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 505-06 (1981)). 
74. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 973 (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 615). 
75. Id. (citing Benzene, 448 U.S. at 64142). See Benzene, 448 U.S. at  64142, 
for a discussion of the difference between "safe" and "risk-free." 
76. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 607-08. Although five different opinions were handed 
down, a majority of five Court members voted to vacate the standard. 
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industry.77 More appropriately, OSHA ultimately bears the 
burden to prove by substantial evidence that such a risk truly 
exists and that the proposed standard is necessary.78 
Next, the Agency was required to  show, by substantial 
evidence, that it was at least more likely than not that the new 
standards would eliminate or  reduce a significant risk in the 
workplace.7g The Court also refused t o  allow OSHA to  set the 
same limit for all industries, "largely as a matter of adminis- 
trative convenience," unless the Agency was able to make the 
requisite showing of sigdicant risk?' Here, the Court relied 
on the exemption of gasoline station employees from the re- 
quirements of the standard despite the fact that they were 
exposed to  the inhalation of gasoline vapors." OSHA's posi- 
tion concerning establishment of a single standard for an entire 
industry was inconsistent because there were other industries 
in which lower levels would have been feasibleOs2 Thus, in the 
Court's view, OSHA's concessions to practicality undermined its 
arguments favoring highly protective standards. 
Finally, the plurality ruled that the substance must pose a 
risk which could be "quantified sufficiently to enable the Secre- 
tary to characterize it as significant in an understandable 
However, the plurality made it clear that although a 
finding of significant risk was required, it did not intend to 
remove OSHA's ability to regulate hazardous substances. In 
other words, the Court will not require the Agency to "wait for 
deaths t o  occur" before taking any action.84 First, the plurality 
said the significant risk requirement is not a "mathematical 
~traightjacket;"~~ rather the determination that a particular 
level of risk is significant can be "based largely on policy con- 
sideration~."~ Second, the Court conceded that OSHA need 
not support its findings "with anything approaching scientific 
77. See id. at 653. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 639-46. 
80. Id. at 650. Although OSHA may determine that a significant risk of harm 
exists in one industry, that determination is not sufficient to apply protective regu- 
lations to all industries in the interests of administrative convenience until a sig- 
d k a n t  risk is shown to exist in each industry. 
81. Id. at 628. 
82. Id. at 650. 
83. Id. at 646. 
84. Id. at 656 n.63. 
85. Id. at 655. 
86. Id. at 656 11.62. 
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certainty," but that it could utilize "conservative assumptions" 
in interpreting data?' In applying the Court's direction, the 
Eleventh Circuit wrote, "!l'he lesson of Benzene is clearly that 
OSHA may use assumptions, but only to the extent that those 
assumptions have some basis in reputable scientific evi- 
d e n ~ e . " ~ ~  Although the Supreme Court granted OSHA leeway 
in making its findings, it did not remove the core requirements 
imposed upon the agency by Congress. Hence, "OSHA is not 
entitled to take short-cuts with statutory requirernent~."~~ 
In this way, the Supreme Court gave OSHA considerable 
flexibility in performing risk assessments and determining that 
a risk was signifkant; however, i t  was clear the Court would 
not permit OSHA to avoid the process entirely by relying on 
mere policy in order to bypass the restrictive guiding princi- . 
ples. 
C. Feasibility 
Once OSHA determines that a toxic substance creates a 
s i m c a n t  risk of material health impairment, it is still not 
free to promulgate any standard. Whatever regulation OSHA 
promulgates must comply with the requirements of section 
6(b)(5) of OSHA. In part, section 6(b)(5) provides: "The Secre- 
tary . . . shall set the standard which most adequately assures, 
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evi- 
dence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of 
health or functional capa~ity."~ Courts have interpreted this 
to mean that "section 6(bX5) mandates that the standard 
adopted 'prevent material impairment of health to the extent 
feasible.' 
An OSHA standard must be feasible in the sense that most 
employers will be able, both technologically and economically, 
to comply with its req~irements .~~ A standard is technological- 
87. Id. at 656; see Victor B. Flatt, OSHA Regulation of low-Exposure Carcino- 
gens.. A New Approach to Judicial Analysis of Scientifu: Evidence, 14 U. PUGm 
SOUND L. REV. 283 (1991). 
88. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 979 (11th Cir. 1992). 
89. Id. at 975. 
90. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988) (emphasis added). 
91. AFLCIO, 965 F.2d at 973 (quoting Cotton Dust, 452 US.  490, 512 
(198 1)). 
92. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 508-09, 513 11.31; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. 
OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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ly feasible if the means of compliance are either already in use 
or will be available within the standard's deadlines.93 
The issue of technological feasibility is generally resolved 
by an OSHA showing "that modern technology has at least 
conceived some industrial strategies . . . which the industries 
are generally capable of adopting.'*4 However, the issues sur- 
rounding economic feasibility are much less settled.95 
A standard is economically feasible if the costs it imposes 
do not "threaten 'massive dislocation' to, or imperil the exis- 
tence of, the ind~stry."~' The Third Circuit used the phrase 
"massive economic dislocation" to describe the extent of eco- 
nomic impact which OSHA would need to fmd before determin- 
ing that a regulation is not economically feasible." Similarly, 
the D.C. Circuit referred to a standard which would make "fi- 
nancial viability generally impos~ible.'*~ The Supreme Court 
accepted the view that a standard is economically feasible if it 
will allow the industry to maintain 'long-term profitability and 
competitiveness.~'g9 Although these definitions are generally 
accepted, their applications remain a source of contention. The 
friction concerns whether OSHA should or may use a cost-bene- 
fit analysis and, in the absence of such analysis, whether 
OSHA must alternatively adopt the most cost-effective alterna- 
tive. 
The issue of economic feasibility was presented to the Su- 
preme Court in Benzene. The lower court had ruled that OSHA 
must show that the "measurable benefits" expected by the 
standard bear a "reasonable relationship" to  the costs im- 
posed.'@' Although the Fifth Circuit had said that no formal 
93. See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at  508-09. 
94. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). 
95. See Howard A. Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standurds: 
An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 583 
(1983). 
96. Marshall, 647 F.2d at  1265 (citations omitted) (quoting AFL-CIO v. 
B r e ~ a n ,  530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975)) (an industry's ability to pass on costs 
becomes relevant to this inquiry if it cannot absorb the costs without massive 
dislocation). 
97. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 123. 
98. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
99. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55. (1981) (quoting Brief of Federal 
Respondent at  49, Cotton Dust (Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583)). 
100. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 501-05 (5th Cir. 1978), 
af'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 
(1980) (the Benzene case). 
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cost-benefit analysis was required, and that a rough, but edu- 
cated, benefit analysis was sufficient, OSHA argued that any 
cost-benefit technique places an "economic value (implicit or ex- 
plicit) on life, health, bereavement pain, and suffering, and 
other consequences of occupational disease and death."lO' The 
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule whether OSHA 
must balance costs and benefits because they were able to  
vacate the benzene standards on significant risk grounds.102 
The issue of economic feasibility was revisited in Cotton 
Dust. The Supreme Court held that OSHA does not require 
cost-benefit analysis.103 The CO& did not expressly rule that 
the cost-benefit analysis is precluded. However, the statement 
in the opinion that cost-benefit was inconsistent with the lan- 
guage, legislative history, and policies of the Act was a strong 
indication that the Court believes cost-benefit analysis is pro- 
hibited? OSHA has since interpreted the decision as pre- 
cluding cost-benefit analysis.lo5 
Although the Supreme Court removed all wind from the 
sails of cost-benefit analysis, it did so only in the area of stan- 
dards regulating toxic substances or h d u l  physical agents. 
The Court did not preclude use of cost-benefit analysis by 
OSHA in priority setting or in other regulatory actions apart 
from section 6(b)(5).lW Although the Cotton Dust opinion 
sounded the death knell for cost-benefit analysis, the Court did 
indicate that the practical impact of using cost-benefit analysis 
would be to force OSHA "to choose the less stringent point" in 
setting standards than would be set if OSHA were left to its 
own feasibility approach.lO' Hence, the tool of cost-benefit 
analysis, although likely to promote efficient and sufficiently 
protective regulations, has been removed from the arsenal of 
both the courts and regulation challengers. 
The issue of cost-benefit analysis, although determined by 
the Supreme Court, still elicits strong expressions from both 
101. Brief for Federal Parties at 62 11.52, Benzene, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Nos. 
78-911, 78-1036). 
102. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639-40. 
103. See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 512-13. 
104. See rd. at 490-92. 
105. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 19, American Dental 
Ass'n v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993) (No. 93-7). 
106. Cotton Dust, 452 US. at 509 11.29 (expressing no opinion on the use of 
cost-benefit analysis to other provisions of the Act). 
107. Id. at 513. 
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proponents and opponents of its use. Supporters argue that its 
economic tools can be most useful to  a rational policymak- 
er.'08 Opponents claim that it obliterates moral values.'0g 
Although the practical effect of the decision was the elimi- 
nation of cost-benefit analysis as a tool of judicial review, the 
doctrine of cost effectiveness was not ab~lished.''~ Cost-bene- 
fit analysis determines whether the social benefits of the regu- 
lation outweigh the costs to the industry of imposing it and, 
therefore, whether standards ought to be imposed at  all. On 
the other hand, cost effectiveness merely compels the choice of 
a less costly alternative in the case where there are multiple 
methods of effectively reducing the significant risk. 
OSHA accepted the doctrine of cost effectiveness, saying 
that "the statute permits the Secretary to  select the least ex- 
pensive means of compliance that will provide an adequate 
level of protection.""' The Supreme Court went even further, 
saying that the possibility existed that OSHA might be re- 
quired to choose a one-respirator standard rather than a five- 
respirator standard, if the same level of protection could be 
reached using both policies.'12 Thus, it is reasonable to expect 
OSHA to adopt the most cost-effective pro~edure.''~ 
108. See Bruce D. Fisher, Controlling Government Regulation: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Before and After the Cotton Dust Case, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 179 (1984). 
109. See Michael S. Baram, Cost Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for 
Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473,' 
502-15 (1980); Barry Roberts & Regina Kossek, Implementation of Economic Impact 
Analysis: The Lessons of OSHA, 83 W .  VA. L. REV. 449 (1981). 
110. Executive Order No. 12,291 was issued "to reduce the burdens of existing 
and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, pro- 
vide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and 
codict of regulations, and insure well reasoned regulations." 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
The executive order further provides that regulatory action should not be taken 
unless the "potential benefits to society outweigh the potential costs." Id. a t  128; 
see infia note 112 (supporting the contention that in promulgating rules, the Sec- 
retary is to select the least expensive alternative which will provide an adequate 
level of protection). 
111. Brief for Federal Respondent at 56, Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) 
(Nos. 79-1429, 79-1583). 
112. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 514 11.32 (1981) (explaining that the "reason- 
ably necessary or appropriate" limitation in section 3(g) might compel OSHA to 
implement the one-respirator standard rather than the five-respirator standard). 
113. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 833 (7th Cir.) (Coffey, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S.  Ct. 172 (1993). 
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111. AMERICAN DENTAL ASS'N V.  MART^ 
AND AFL-CIO V. OSHA 
A. The Facts: American Dental Ass'n v. Martin 
On December 6, 1991, OSHA promulgated a rule on occu- 
pational exposure to bloodborne pathogens.'" The rule was 
designed to protect health care workers from viruses, particu- 
larly the hepatitis B (HBV) and the AIDS-causing human im- 
munodeficiency viruses (HIV). Three employer groups chal- 
lenged the rule: dentists, medical personnel firms, and home 
health care providers. 'I5 
The OSHA rule adopted the philosophy of "universal pre- 
cautions," which means safeguards are taken against the blood 
of every individual rather than just the blood of patients known 
or believed to  be likely carriers of HBV or HIV. The regulations 
included engineering controls,116 work practice contro1s,'" 
requirements for personal protective equipment,'" house- 
keeping req~irements,"~ reporting requirements,120 and if 
warranted, provisions for medical care.121 
A person infected with HBV has a one in three chance of 
contracting acute hepatitis, a serious and sometimes fatal liver 
disease. "Although most infected persons recover uneventfully, 
about one percent die and about six to ten percent of adult . . . 
victims of Hepatitis I3 become carriers."lB A vaccination ex- 
ists for HBV which is effective for eighty-five to ninety-seven 
percent of persons to whom it is admini~tered.'~ HBV can be 
transmitted through blood-to-blood contact or through the virus 
contact with mucous membranes in the eyes, nose, or mouth. 
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) calculated that over a 
forty-five year working lifetime, 83 to 113 of every 1000 non- 
immune health care workers would suffer an HBV infection, 
from which two or three would die." The court relied upon 
114. 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.1030 (1991). 
115. Martin, 984 F.2d at 824. 
116. 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.1030(d)(2Xviii) (1991). 
117. Id. 5 1910.1030(dX2Xvi). 
118. Id. 8 1910.103O(dX3Xi). 
119. Id. 8 19lO.l03O(dX4). 
120. Id. 8 1910.1030(f)(1). 
121. Id. 3 1910.1030(fX3). 
122. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir.), cert. de- 
nied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993). 
123. Id. 
124. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,028-29, 64,028-35 (1991). 
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statistics which indicate that patient-communicated hepatitis B 
kills approximately two hundred health workers in the United 
States annually. '* 
Infection with HIV leads to acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), a disease which to  date has proven fatal. 
HIV can also be spread through blood-to-blood contact. It com- 
monly occurs through needlesticks or when contaminated blood 
comes in contact with non-intact skidz6 HIV is not as easily 
transmitted as HBV due to  HWs inability to  remain viable 
outside of the body. Consequently, "as of 1991, there had been 
only 24 confirmed cases of U.S. health care workers infected 
with the AIDS virus."127 
In promulgating the standard, OSHA determined that 
bloodborne pathogens posed a significant risk of material 
health impairment to employees and that the standard was 
reasonably necessary and appropriate to eliminate or substan- 
tially reduce that risk. OSHA further determined that its as- 
sessment of significant risk justified imposition of the standard 
based on occupational exposure to  blood. This determination 
disregarded the worker's particular occupational or  workplace 
setting. OSHA also discussed alternative standards. In particu- 
lar, it rejected a mandatory HBV program determining that a 
significant risk of HBV remained even with a universal vaccine 
and that "the hepatitis B vaccine will not protect employees 
from other bloodborne pathogens such as HIV."'" 
Pursuant to section 6(f) of OSHA,'% the American Dental 
Association (ADA) sought review of OSHA's standards in the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The dental association con- 
tended that OSHA failed to consider each sector of the health 
care industry separately, thereby finding a significant risk of 
material health impairment in all health care occupations due 
to their failure to disaggregate the ind~s t ry . '~  Although the 
ADA conceded that a significant risk of infection existed in 
some health care procedures, they contended the risk was not 
sufficiently significant to warrant its application to dental 
health care  setting^.'^' Additionally, the ADA charged that 
125. Martin, 984 F.2d at 824. 
126. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,016-17 (1991). 
127. Martin, 984 F.2d at 824. 
128. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,037 (1991). 
129. 29 U.S.C. 8 655(f) (1988). 
130. Martin, 984 F.2d at 826. 
131. Id. at 826. 
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the standards imposed enormous economic costs on the dental 
health care profession at a time of major reforms to control the 
rising cost of health care.'" On January 28, 1993, a 2-1 opin- 
ion was issued rejecting ADA's challenge.lm 
B. The Martin Court's Reasoning 
Initially, the majority dealt with the American Dental 
Association's objection that OSHA failed to  disaggregate the 
health industry into various sectords4 The court ac- 
knowledged OSHA's failure to assess the potential risk to 
workers on an industry-by-industry basis.'" However, the 
court did note that OSHA "gave separate consideration to every 
point raised before it by the dental association. It pointed out 
that the saliva of dental patients frequently contains blood . . . 
and that it is possible, though far from certain, that even a 
small quantity of blood . . . can sometimes be infective."lSB 
Thus, the court exhibited deference enabling OSHA to adopt 
whatever regulations it believed necessary and allowed them to 
recognize a risk of bloodborne pathogens within the medical 
industry as a whole.13' 
In promulgating the rule, OSHA treated all sectors of the 
health care industry as if each were part of one generic whole. 
'What OSHA did not do was attempt to  disaggregate the risk 
industry by industry."ls8 Although it computed the costs each 
sector would bear to  determine whether the economic feasibili- 
ty rule would proscribe imposition of the standard in that sec- 
tor, "it did not attempt to  determine separately the risk of HIV 
or HBV infection in dentistry, in home-health services, in tho- 
racic surgery, in ophthalmology, and so forth."lsg 
The court warned that "OSHA cannot impose onerous 
requirements on an industry that does not pose substantial 
hazards to  the safety or health of its workers merely because 
the industry is a part of some larger sector or group- 
132. See id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
133. Id. at 823. 
134. Id. at 826-27. 
135. "What OSHA did not do was attempt to disaggregate the risk industry by 
industry." Id. at 827. 
136. Id. at 826-27. 
137. "It is not our business to pick the happy medium between these extremes. 
It is OSHA's business." Id. at 827. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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ing . . . ."140 However, it recognized that requiring the agency 
to "proceed workplace by workplace" would result in regulatory 
inefficiency and require "hundreds of thousands of separate 
rules."141 Given this choice, the court again adopted a defer- 
ential approach, stating: "It is not our business to pick the hap- 
py medium between these extremes. It is OSHA's business. If it 
provides a rational explanation for its choice, we are 
bound."142 Therefore, by abdicating the responsibility of se- 
lecting a happy medium, the court allowed OSHA t o  adopt a 
nonsensical extreme. 
Next, the opinion considered whether bloodborne patho- 
gens pose a significant risk of material health impairment to 
health care workers and whether the regulations are reason- 
ably necessary or appropriate to  eliminate or substantially 
reduce that risk. Here, the court supplied the greatest example 
of judicial abdication of its reviewing role to  the "better judg- 
ment" of a regulatory agency. 
On this point, the court stated: "OSHA's evaluation of the 
effects of the rule, relying as it does on the undoubted expertise 
of the Centers for Disease Control, cannot seriously be faulted, 
at least by judges. Hence we cannot say that the rule . . . flunks 
the test of material reduction of a significant risk to  workplace 
health."143 Furthermore, the court ruled that if requirements, 
"whether wise or not, are within the broad bounds-of the rea- 
sonable," then they should be "entitled t o  respect by the non- 
specialist, biomedically unsophisticated Article I11 judicia- 
ry*"lM 
Finally, the court dealt with objections that the rule did 
not satisfy the feasibility requirement. The majority opinion 
acknowledged significant errors by OSHA with respect to the 
costs and benefits realized because of the final rule.145 Re- 
garding the standard of economic feasibility, the court em- 




143. Id. at 825 (emphasis added). 
144. Id. at 828. 
145. Id. at 826 (the majority expressed skepticism concerning the accuracy of 
OSHA's projected costs to the dental industry ($813 million estimate is an underes- 
timate) and projected valuation of lives saved by the regulations ($4 million per 
life is also an underestimate)). 
116 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
OSHA did not (indeed is not authorized to) compare the 
benefits with the costs and impose the restrictions on finding 
that the former exceeded the latter. Instead it asked whether 
the restrictions would materially reduce a ,significant 
workplace risk to human health without imperiling the exis- 
tence of, or threatening massive dislocation to, the health care 
industry. For this is the applicable legal standard.146 
Although the rule adopted by the majority to  not require the 
regulations to  pass a cost-benefit analysis is consistent with the 
Supreme Court opinion in Cotton Dust, the majority failed to 
discuss the cost-effectiveness of the reg~1ation.l~~ 
The majority conceded that the final rule "may be unneces- 
sary; it may go too far; its costs may exceed its benefits."'" 
Yet, the majority disregarded those errors and upheld the rule, 
concluding that a reviewing court merely patrols the boundary 
of reasonableness and that the bloodborne-pathogen rule "does 
not cross it."14' 
C. The Facts: AFL-CIO v. OSHA 
On January 19, 1989, OSHA issued a new set of Air Con- 
taminants Standards15' t o  update previously existing stan- 
dards pursuant to  section 6(b) of OSHA.lS1 This revised stan- 
dard pertained to the permissible exposure 'levels (PELs) for 
428 different toxic substances. Specifically, the standards low- 
ered the PELs for 212 substances, set new standards for 164 
newly regulated substances, and left 52 other substances un- 
changed. 152 
Challengers to  the standards contended that "OSHA's use 
of generic findings, the lumping together of so many substances 
146. Id. at 825 (citing 29 U.S.C. Q 655 03x5) (1988); Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 
642-45, 655-56 (1980); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 509-12, 530-36 (1981)). 
147. "The most cost effective and costefficient regulation would be to require 
HBV vaccinations for all health care workers a t  risk of exposure in the United 
States, and to enforce existing state regulations." Id. at  847 (Coffey, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Certainly HBV vaccinations for all health care 
workers would be less expensive than the $813 million imposed upon the dental 
industry by the existing regulations. 
148. Id. at 831. 
149. Id. 
150. 54 Fed. Reg. 2332-2983 (1989) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. Q 1910). 
151. 29 U.S.C. Q 65503) (1988). 
152. AF'L-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1992). "Permissible expo- . 
sure limits (PELs) reflect the maximum amount of contaminants in air to which 
workers may be exposed over a given time period." H. at 968 n.4. 
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in one rulemaking, and the short time provided for com- 
ment . . . combine to create a record inadequate to. support this 
massive new set of PELs."lSS On July 7, 1992, a unanimous 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the standards and 
remanded them to  the agency.'54 
D. The Reasoning in AFL-CIO v. OSHA 
The court in AFL-CIO employed a careful analysis of each 
hurdle set up by the Supreme Court and carefully specified 
where and how OSHA's findings failed to clear the required 
obstacles. Regarding the standard of review, the court noted its 
statutorily defined responsibility to  only uphold OSHA findings 
if they were "supported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole."'55 Hence, the court rejected taking a 
deferential approach stating it "must take a 'harder look' at 
OSHA's action than [it] would if [it] were reviewing the action 
under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious stan- 
dard.n156 
The court rejected the procedures used by OSHA to  create 
the rules as "generic r~lemaking."'~' The challenged stan- 
dards dealt with 428 different substances affecting twenty- 
seven different industries. While the court ruled that "noth- 
ing . . . prevent[ed] OSHA from addressing multiple substances 
in a single rulemaking,"'" this did not allow the court to ig- 
nore the requirements of the Act. The rule enunciated by the 
court requires OSHA to  find that the significant risk of materi- 
al health impairment exists for each and every regulated sub- 
stance individually to  be upheld. '" 
The agency's determination of the extent of risk imposed 
by the individual substances was problematic. The court found 
that "OSHA has a responsibility to quantify or explain, at least 
to  some reasonable degree, the risk posed by each toxic sub- 
153. Id. at 971. 
154. Id. at 962. 
155. Id. at 969-70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 8 655(f) (1988)). 
156. Id. at 970 (quoting Asbestos Info. A s h  v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). 
157. Id. at 971 (emphasis omitted). 
158. Id. at 972. 
159. "W]e believe the PEL for each substance must be able to stand indepen- 
dently, i.e., that each PEL must be supported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole and accompanied by adequate explanation." Id. 
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" [Hlowever, OSHA made no attempt to estimate 
the risk."lel Rather, OSHA took short cuts and "merely pro- 
vided a conclusory statement that the new PEL will reduce the 
'significant' risk of material health effects shown t o  be caused 
by that substance, without any explanation of how the agency 
determined that the risk was signifi~ant."'~~ 
Finally, the court considered whether the new standards 
satisfied the feasibility requirement. Again, the court demand- 
ed that OSHA satisfy its requirements. The opinion stated that 
"[dlespite OSHA's repeated claims that it made feasibility de- 
terminations on an industry-by-industry basis, it is clear that 
the agency again proceeded 'generi~ally.'"'~~ The "general 
presumption of feasibility" afforded to  OSHA "does not grant a 
license to  make excessively broad generalities as to  feasibili- 
ty."lgp OSHA failed to demonstrate economic feasibility for 
each affected industry.lBS 
IV. ANALYSIS OF MARTIN AND AFL-CIO UNDER THE 
MICROSCOPE OF ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES 
A. The Standard of Review 
By adopting the deferential role of patrol guards at the 
border of reasonabilitylBp in the review process, the majority 
in Martin not only disregarded guiding principles established 
by the Supreme Court, but also sent dangerous signals to  
OSHA concerning its regulatory powers. If the position of the 
Martin majority were to  be universally adopted, OSHA would 
be free to impose regulations without meaningful limit, extend- 
ing to the nonsensical limit where no reasonable mind could 
uphold the rule without fear of judicial invalidation.le7 
On the other hand, the AFL-CIO court faithfully dis- 
charged its duty to  require OSHA t o  justify its conclusion 
through a showing of substantial evidence. By so doing, the 
Eleventh Circuit created an atmosphere in which the regulato- 
160. Id. at 975 (emphasis omitted). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. (citations omitted). 
163. Id. at 980. 
164. Id. at 981-82. 
165. See id. at 982. 
166. See American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993). 
167. See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981). 
F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir.), cert. 
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ry agency was not given free range to act as legislature, execu- 
tive, and judiciary without making an accounting for that au- 
thority. Rather, by adopting the hard-look approach, the court 
allowed OSHA the requisite autonomy to  Nfill its intended 
purpose, while reserving a critical check on potentially unbri- 
dled power. 
On balance, the AFL-CIO court employed the more correct 
reviewing standard. The Martin court failed because it did not 
take a "harder look" as suggested by the Fifth1" and Elev- 
enth Circuits. Moreover, because it did not require OSHA to 
support its conclusions by substantial evidence, the court mere- 
ly deferred to the expertise of the agency and opted for "admin- 
istrative convenience."16g A proper review requires the court 
to consider both the evidence supporting the agency's regula- 
tions as well as evidence calling for judicial invalidation. "Fur- 
thermore, 'the validity of an agency's determination must be 
judged on the basis of the agency's stated reasons for making 
that determinati~n.'""~ 
Judge Posner neither questioned OSHA's motives nor did 
he seriously consider the merits of the dentists' contentions 
that the regulations were unnecessary and harmful. Judge 
Coffey, in his dissent, charged that "[tlhe rule was drafted 
partially in response to the public hysteria surrounding AIDS 
created by the media's failure to balance their reporting with 
scientific data on transmissi~n."~~~ 
The result of a judgment in which the court fails to probe 
the record to  find evidence supporting OSHA's determinations 
establishes a high water mark for deference to an agency that 
does not do its job. Courts must remember that the burden of 
proof is upon the agency. By failing to perform their reviewing 
role, courts indicate that they will allow OSHA to continue to 
impose excessive regulatory burdens on industry in an arbi- 
trary and capricious manner. The purposes of the congressio- 
nally created procedural safeguards, whereby OSHA can be 
168. Asbestos Info. Ass'n v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 1984). 
169. Martin, 984 F.2d at 836 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing International Union, United Automobile Workers v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 
1310, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
170. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Benzene, 
448 US. 607, 631 n.31 (1980)). 
171. Martin, 984 F.2d at 831 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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held accountable and responsible for the results of its actions 
are frustrated when courts do not take a hard-look approach. 
B. Existence of a Significant Risk of 
Material Health Impairment 
The greatest error reached first by OSHA and then by the 
Martin court was a determination that a significant risk of 
material health impairment exists in the dental health care 
industry.172 The applicable legal standard in this area is that 
OSHA has the burden of proving that there currently exists a 
"significant risk of material health impairment" to employees 
and that the new standard is "reasonably necessary or appro- 
priate" to eliminate or substantially reduce that risk.173 
In order to reach the results necessary to justify regula- 
tion, OSHA engaged in faulty analysis and misrepresentation 
of actual risk.lV4 Little doubt exists concerning the existence 
of significant risk if the entire health care community is viewed 
as a whole. Figures supplied by OSHA and relied upon by the 
majority show that in addition to the twenty-four confirmed 
cases of AIDS, Hepatitis B kills approximately 200 health care 
workers ann~al1y.l~~ However, these figures are reached only 
when twenty-four health care industry sectors are aggregated 
together. 
A valid finding of significant risk could have been reached 
if OSHA had disaggregated each identifiable sector. In his 
dissenting opinion, Judge Coffey postulated, "Apparently OSHA 
realized it was unable to establish a significant risk in the 
appellants' respective fields andlor for the sake of convenience 
172. "OSHA's fatal error, in my opinion, occurred when it failed to recognize 
and consider the varying risk of occupational exposure in the respective appellants' 
professions." Id. at 839 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
173. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 615, 653; Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 506 (1981). 
174. "OSHA made a hodgepodge of findings . . . resulting in nothing but a 
generalized determination of significant risk . . . ." Martin, 984 F.2d at 833 
(Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
175. Id. at 824. 
176. The twenty-four industry sectors include: offices of physicians (including 
ambulatory medical services), dental offices, hospitals, medical-id dental laborag 
ries, nursing homes, residential care facilities, dialysis centers, drug treatment 
centers, home health care, hospices, government outpatient facilities, blood collec- 
tion and processing, health clinics in industrial facilities, personnel services, funeral 
homes and crematories, research laboratories, linen services, medical and dental 
equipment repair, law enforcement, fwe and rescue, correctional institutions, 
schools, lifesaving, and regulated waste removal. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,041 (1991). 
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chose to combine the risk present in the entire health care 
area."'" Had OSHA disaggregated the various sectors, it 
would have been unable to regulate the dental profession. Only 
one individual out of the twenty-five HIV cases relied upon by 
OSHA to constitute sigmfkant risk was employed in the dental 
professi~n.'~~ Certainly a single incident is certainly not suffi- 
cient to constitute significant risk. Similarly, OSHA failed t o  
determine the number of HBV cases among the respective sec- 
tors. Rather, OSHA relied on CDC estimates that 8700 cases 
occur annually throughout the health care industry.'79 
Failing to  disaggregate a sector of a larger industry is not 
consistent with prior OSHA  practice^.'^^ Criticizing the 
majority's treatment of this issue, Coffey noted, "[Tlhere are no 
obvious barriers t o  disaggregation here. In fact, OSHA has in 
past years promulgated a wide variety of industry and 
equipment-specific lockout  standard^."^^' OSHA did not satis- 
fy its requirement to show that dental health care workers are 
exposed to a risk which can be categorized as significant. 
The Seventh Circuit's error is magnified when compared 
with the treatment given to generic rulemaking by the Elev- 
enth Circuit. That court correctly required OSHA to  be very 
specific, at least to some reasonable degree, in quantifying the 
extent of the risk each substance posed to workers. The AFL- 
CIO court refused to close its eyes and respect repetitions of 
OSHA boilerplate findings that the new limit would protect 
workers from significant risk of some material health impair- 
ment. lS2 
Had the analysis in AFL-CIO been applied to the dental 
association's argument that the dental health care sector had 
not been disaggregated, the bloodborne-pathogens rule would 
177. Martin, 984 F.2d at 835 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
178. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,017-19) (only 1 dentist out of the 100,000 prac- 
ticing dentists has tested positive for HIV). 
179. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,026) (there are 280,000 HBV infections annu- 
ally). 
180. See id. at 834 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1980) (the 
cotton ginning industry was excluded from the airborne concentration of cotton dust 
standard); 29 C.F.R. $ 1910.1043(a)(2) (1993). For further examples of OSHA ex- 
cluding specific industry sectors from a rule, see Martin, 984 F.2d at  834 n.7. 
181. Martin, 984 F.2d at  834 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (emphasis added) (citing International Union, United Automobile Workers v. 
OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
182. AF'L-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 972 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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certainly have been invalidated. The Eleventh Circuit's require- 
ment that each rule must be able "to stand independently, . . . 
supported by substantial evidence in the re~ord" '~  would 
have required OSHA to disaggregate the health care industry 
and then show that a si&icant risk existed in each sector. 
Another failure of OSHA and the Martin court was their 
erroneous finding that the new regulation reduced or eliminat- 
ed the risk. The bloodborne-pathogen rule provided no new 
significant benefits to  employees while it did impose costs and 
burdens on employers. 
At the time of the rule's promulgation, the dental industry 
was already operating under a number of CDC guidelines, state 
agency and professional institution regulations, and voluntary 
measures such as HBV va~cination.'~~ Given the standards 
which dentists used to protect themselves from health hazards 
and the admitted efficiency of the HBV vaccination, there is 
little evidence upon which OSHA could rely to suggest that its 
standards did anything more to  reduce the risk to workers. 
Given the state of regulation prior to  rule promulgation, Judge 
Coffey was justified in suggesting that "a 'rule is arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency . . . entirely failed to consider an im- 
portant aspect of the problem,'"ls5 and that this 'leads to but 
one conclusion, that the final rule can and must be classified as 
arbitrary and caprici~us."'~~ 
C. Feasibility 
The final hurdle OSHA must overcome to  justify the impo- 
sition of a regulation is a showing that the standards are both 
. 
technologically and economically feasible. Technological feasi- 
bility was not a contested issue in Martin, as many of the 
OSHA regulations were being observed prior to promulgation of 
the rule. Additionally, representatives of the dental industry do 
not argue that the entire health care industry should be ex- 
empted from regulation. On the other hand, in AFL-CIO the 
PEL standards were not found to be technologically feasible. 
The facts concerning this issue were not disputed and do not 
provide a useful forum for instructive contrast. 
183. Id. 
184. See Martin, 984 F.2d at 837. 
185. Id. (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
186. Id. at 837-38 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Economic feasibility, on the other hand, is very much an 
issue of contention. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that OSHA 
failed to show that the PEL standard was economically feasible 
for the same reasons it found a lack of technological feasibility 
and sigdkant risk; that the agency only determined "feasi- 
bility for each industry 'sector,' . . . without explaining why 
such a broad grouping was appropriate."'" Continuing the 
theme of examining each industry separately, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded: "Indeed, it would seem particularly impor- 
tant not to aggregate disparate industries when making a 
showing of economic fea~ibility."'~~ Although this analysis is 
correct and was applicable to  the case before the court, the 
opinion fails to  provide a useful application of the Supreme 
Court's guiding principles concerning economic feasibility. The 
illustrative concepts and implications of the economic feasibility 
issue present themselves in an examination of the Martin deci- 
sion. However, the proper model is not exemplified by what the 
Seventh Circuit did; rather, it is suggested by what it failed to 
do. 
The Martin majority held that the standard was economi- 
cally feasible despite the fact that the bloodborne-pathogen 
standard failed the cost-benefit test, the cost-effectiveness test, 
and the economic efficiency test. In lone dissent, Judge Coffey 
recognized that "[tlhe rule unduly burden[ed] health care em- 
ployers, including but not limited to  dentists, doctors and hos- 
pitals."'" 
It is surprising that this majority, Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook, upheld the regulation utilizing such faulty eco- 
nomic analysis. Judges Posner and Easterbrook "are both prop- 
erly recognized and respected as experts in the field of econom- 
ics as well as law."lgo Posner, who wrote for the majority, is 
the author of Economic Analysis of Law, in which he states: 
"This book is written in the conviction that economics is a pow- 
e r N  tool for analyzing a vast range of legal  question^."'^^ 
Posner correctly maintained that OSHA "did not (indeed is 
not authorized to) compare the benefits with the costs" of a 
187. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 982 (emphasis added). 
188. Id. 
189. Martin, 984 F.2d at 831-32 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
190. Id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
191. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (3d ed. 1986). 
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regulation.lg2 Rather, his economic analysis only examined 
"whether the restrictions would . . . imperil[] the existence of, 
or threaten[] massive dislocation to, the health care indus- 
try."lg3 Posner was probably correct in asserting that the add- 
ed $813 million a year in costs imposed by the regulations will 
not bankrupt the U.S. health care industry.lg4 However, the 
health care system and its accompanying insurance systems 
"are struggling and almost bankrupt partially because of exces- 
sive and unnecessary regulations . . . ."lg5 Although the exis- 
tence of the health care industry may not be at  risk, further 
OSHA regulations which exacerbate the health care crisis may 
do more harm than good. 
If the reviewing court were allowed to engage in cost-bene- 
fit analysis, the rule would not survive the scrutiny of judicial 
review. The benefits realized from the bloodborne-pathogens 
rule are relatively small. As discussed above, the rule does not 
secure significant benefits for health care workers. Given the 
previous state of regulation and voluntary vaccination, very 
little is gained by the OSHA regulation. Even accepting 
OSHA's estimated value of human life (about $4 mi l l i~n) '~  
multiplied by the one confirmed case of AIDS in a dental work- 
er and the uncertain estimate of HBV fatalities, the benefits 
are sigdiicantly outweighed by the costs imposed by the stan- 
dards. If required, the OSHA regulations would not pass an 
economic cost- benefit analysis. 
Despite the fact that OSHA is not compelled to  engage in 
cost-benefit analysis, "the Supreme Court has recommended 
that OSHA . . . consider drafting the less costly of two equally 
effective  proposal^."^^' Given the Supreme Court's statements 
in the Cotton Dust case,lg8 it is reasonable to  expect a review- 
ing court to require OSHA to  pass a cost effectiveness test. 
In addition to the universal precautions based bloodborne- 
pathogens rule promulgated by OSHA, there is another alter- 
192. Martin, 984 F.2d at 825. 
193. Id. at 825 (citing 29 U.S.C. 8 655(b)(5) (1988); Benzene, 448 U.S. 607, 
642-45, 655-56 (1980) (plurality opinion); Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 509-12, 530-36 
(198 1)). 
194. See id. at 825 (stating that costs of $813 million per year are "clearly not 
enough to break the multi-hundred-billion dollar health care industry"). 
195. Id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
196. Id. at 825. 
197. Id. at 838 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
198. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.32 (1981). 
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native which would be substantially equal in effectively reduc- 
ing whatever risk exists to  health care workers. Even OSHA 
has admitted that "[tlhe risk of HBV infection is most efficient- 
ly and dramatically reduced by vaccinating all workers exposed 
t o  blood and other potentially infectious  material^."'^^ 
Coffey's dissent magnified the faltering of the agency's policy 
when he noted that, "For reasons unknown and contrary to 
sound medical judgment and research, OSHA concluded that 
even though vaccinations would reduce almost all risk of health 
care professionals becoming infected by HBV, the additional far 
more expansive, impractical and cost inefficient precautions 
were necessary."200 
Although some may note that there are individuals who 
will refuse to  be vaccinated,zO' this is not a compelling argu- 
ment. OSHA has authority to adopt a mandatory vaccination 
program.202 When viable alternatives are available to  OSHA, 
it should not be allowed to adopt rules whose benefits could be 
achieved through far more efficient and reasonable means. 
Finally, adoption of these standards creates economic inef- 
ficiency and violates sound judicial discretion. At this time of 
reform, unwarranted and repetitious regulation will create 
false signals in the health care market. Regulations which 
impose costs will cause demand for health care to diminish. As 
these costs increase, providers will either pass them on t o  con- 
sumers or will be forced to bear them through a reduction of 
profits. Innocent third parties will be adversely impacted by the 
regulations, as costs are passed on to consumers, resulting in a 
decrease of the amount of health care demanded. Although 
such a decrease in the dental, industry will rarely have fatal 
results, it will result in a general deterioration of dental health 
and an increase in general suffering. 
Chief Judge Stephen Breye?03 has written: 
199. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,036 (1991). 
200. Martin, 984 F.2d at 839 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (emphasis omitted) (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,036-38 (1991)). 
201. Id. at 825. 
202. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that vaccina- 
tion can be required despite objections on the grounds of religion and privacy); see 
also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
319-20 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 147-54 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). 
203. Stephen G. Breyer is the Chief Judge of the First Circuit Court of Ap- 
peals. 
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The development of voluntary standards by industry 
groups creates little risk of harm to the firm through error, 
for their voluntariness allows individual firms to reject the 
standards if they are absurd, inappropriate, or simply wrong. 
When a "should" in such a standard is changed to a "must," 
however, the risk of harm increases.204 
It is surprising to the informed observer to find Judge Breyer 
making an argument promoting economic efficiency and to find 
the economically conservative Judge Posner in the opposite 
camp. 
One of the sharpest critics of OSHA regulations on the 
basis that they are economically inefficient is Judge Posner 
himself. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, which directs 
the establishment of minimum federal standards of worker 
safety and health, is a particularly ambitious example of 
worker protection legislation. Is i t  necessary? The employer 
has a selfish interest in providing the optimal level of worker 
health and safety . . . . Legislation prescribing the health and 
safety conditions of employment may raise the level of health 
and safety beyond the level desired by the employees and the 
employers . . . ?05 
After noting the only winners with OSHA regulations are labor 
unions, he concludes: 
Properly administered (an enormous qualification), 
OSHA might, therefore, simply raise the level of occupational 
safety and health to the level a t  which it would be but for the 
public subsidy of workers' injuries and illnesses. The problem, 
however, with using one government intervention in the mar- 
ketplace . . . to justify another . . . is that it invites an indefi- 
nite and unwarranted expansion in government. A series of 
incremental steps each of which makes economic sense in 
light of the previous steps may, looked a t  as  a whole, make no 
economic sense at 
Regardless of which test is utilized, the OSHA bloodborne- 
pathogens rule is not economically feasible. Additionally, the 
inefficient government regulation imposes unnecessary costs 
204. BREYER, supra note 38, at 102. 
205. POSNER, supra note 191, at 311. 
206. Id. at 312 (emphasis added). 
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upon the dental care consumer, reduces the number of individ- 
uals employed in the industry, and confers negligible benefits 
upon health care workers. Ultimately, no one is protected by or 
benefits from the rule. 
Proper judicial review is the only procedural safeguard 
established by Congress to check excessive regulation by 
OSHA. When a circuit court of appeals correctly applies the 
guiding principles established by the Supreme Court and ful- 
fdls its reviewing role, it promotes administrative fidelity to  
congressional intent. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin and 
AFL-CIO v. OSHA are excellent examples of the divergent roles 
courts of appeals have elected to  play in this process of judicial 
review of OSHA regulation. 
The rules and applications of law forwarded by the Elev- 
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in ML-CIO are more jurispru- 
dentially correct than the hands-off approach taken by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin. Judicial review of 
OSHA regulations as applied in Martin takes a step back- 
wards. Its results prove catastrophic to an employer's ability to 
meaningfully challenge onerous and burdensome regulations. 
Rather than forcing OSHA to remain within the confines of its 
authority as conferred by Congress, this decision exhibited a 
tendency by courts to adopt a deferential attitude towards 
regulatory agencies. Under such a system, the only remaining 
escape from inefficient regulation is a showing that the rule is 
so burdensome that it imperils the very existence of the entire 
industry. 
Given the current conflict of rulings among the circuits, the 
United States Supreme Court ought to  grant certiorari in the 
future in an appropriate case, with the purpose of clarifying 
this area of law. In the event that the Court does rule on a 
such a case, they would be well advised to follow the Eleventh 
Circuit's ML-CIO lead by establishing the "harder look" stan- 
dard of review, requiring OSHA to show with reasonable cer- 
tainty that a sigmficant risk of material health impairment 
exists, and compelling OSHA to use the cost-effectiveness test. 
Sound economic reasoning argues that any governmental 
regulation is inefficient and that self-interested employers will 
voluntarily impose upon themselves the optimal amount of 
128 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
safety standards as the most efficient form of reg~lation.~~' 
However, it is a political and social reality that Congress has 
placed a higher value upon an over-regulated workplace in 
favor of worker protection at the cost of economic efficiency. 
Consequently, this proposed standard strikes the optimal bal- 
ance between the desire to  assure "safe and healthful working 
conditions"208 and the need to sufficiently protect employers 
from "arbitrary and capricious" OSHA regulations. 
The race to the courthouse, in the OSHA context, has de- 
veloped because of a divergence of views amongst the circuits 
regarding their review responsibilities. Although the Supreme 
Court has set forth principles for the substantive content of 
OSHA standards, these differences in approach may in reality 
go beyond the question of the formal rule of law to be applied. 
Rather, it may focus on a far broader question of whether the 
court is sympathetic to  the agency's regulatory goals and the 
social politics of the thing being regulatec12" However, until 
the Supreme Court resolves the conflict and so long as the 
parties perceive that certain courts of appeals are more (or 
less) sympathetic to  the agency's regulatory efforts, the race 
will surely continue. 
David R. Cherrington 
207. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 16-18 (1988). 
208. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988). 
209. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 831, 841 (7th. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993) (OSHA promulgated this rule in response to the 
media coverage of the AIDS epidemic rather than in response to a signscant risk 
of harm). 
